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AEDPA AND THE PLRA AFTER
25 YEARS: INTRODUCTION
Jonathan L. Entin†
In 1996, Congress passed two important statutes that bear on the
criminal justice system. The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty
Act1 sought to recalibrate the relationship between state and federal
courts by limiting the scope of federal habeas corpus review of state
criminal convictions and by restricting the availability of federal habeas
relief.2 Proponents of these provisions sought “to curb the abuse of the
habeas corpus process, and particularly to address the problem of delay
and repetitive litigation in capital cases.”3
The Prison Litigation Reform Act4 limited the availability of federal
relief for prisoners by codifying exhaustion requirements, mandating full
payment of filing fees, authorizing judicial screening of prisoner
complaints before docketing that can result in revocation of good-time
credit, requiring a physical injury as a basis for recovery for mental or
emotional injury, and adding a “three strikes” rule that bars prisoner
access to federal court in certain circumstances.5 These provisions
†

David L. Brennan Professor Emeritus of Law and Adjunct Professor of
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1.

Pub. L. No. 104–132, tit. I, 110 Stat. 1214, 1217–26 (1996) (codified at 28
U.S.C. §§ 2244, 2253–2255, 2261–2266 (2018)).

2.

AEDPA also contains provisions relating to terrorism that are beyond the
scope of this symposium.

3.

H.R. Rep. No. 104–23, at 8 (1995). Concern about delays in death penalty
cases also arose at the state level. For example, in 1994 the Ohio
Constitution was amended to eliminate the jurisdiction of the court of
appeals in death penalty cases. Under the new arrangement, all appeals
in death penalty cases go directly to the state supreme court as a matter
of right. See Ohio Const. art. IV, §§ 2(B)(2)(a)(ii), 3(B)(2). Under this
arrangement, death penalty defendants receive only one round of appellate
review whereas other criminal defendants have the opportunity for two
rounds of appeals, one by right to the court of appeals and the possibility
of discretionary review in the supreme court. Before the 1994 amendment,
death penalty defendants were provided with two rounds of appellate review
as a matter of right: first in the court of appeals, and then in the supreme
court. The Ohio Supreme Court rejected a federal constitutional challenge
to the new arrangement in the first case that arose under the 1994 amendment. State v. Smith, 684 N.E.2d 668, 678–85 (Ohio 1997).

4.

Omnibus Consolidated Rescissions and Appropriations Act of 1996, Pub.
L. No. 104–134, tit. VIII, 110 Stat. 1321, 1321–66 to –77 (codified at 18
U.S.C. § 3626 note, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b)(2), 1915–1915A & 42 U.S.C.
§ 1997e) (2018).

5.

The PLRA also contains provisions relating to remedies for unlawful
prison conditions. 18 U.S.C. § 3626 (2018).
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sought to reduce judicial oversight of prison operations and deter what
proponents regarded as a torrent of frivolous lawsuits that undermined
the authority of correctional officials and imposed unjustified costs on
government at all levels.6
Both of these statutes quickly elicited criticism.7 They also have
generated substantial bodies of jurisprudence.8 To mark the twentyfifth anniversary of AEDPA and the PLRA, the Case Western Reserve
Law Review held a symposium in November 2021 that brought together
a wide range of scholars, practitioners, and federal judges to discuss
many questions about those statutes. This issue contains papers that
were presented on that occasion.
The first three papers in this symposium issue address the relationship between the statutes and the COVID-19 pandemic. Nancy J. King
focuses on the equitable powers of federal courts under AEDPA during
the pandemic.9 She emphasizes that this statute, whatever else it did,
left intact judicial authority to grant habeas relief to prisoners held in
violation of the Constitution. That authority is embodied in 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241. Professor King examines how some federal courts during the
pandemic have used the equitable discretion that Section 2241 affords.
More generally, she suggests that equitable considerations are important factors in addressing emergencies and unanticipated developments
6.

See, e.g., 141 Cong. Rec. 26448–49 (1995) (statement of Sen. Abraham);
id. at 26548–49 (statement of Sen. Dole); id. at 26553 (statement of Sen.
Hatch); id. at 26553–54 (statement of Sen. Kyl).

7.

See, e.g., Mark Tushnet & Larry Yackle, Symbolic Statutes and Real
Laws: The Pathologies of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty
Act and the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 47 Duke L.J. 1 (1997); John
Boston, The Prison Litigation Reform Act: The New Face of Court
Stripping, 67 Brook. L. Rev. 429 (2001); Kenneth Williams, The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act: What’s Wrong with It and
How to Fix It, 33 Conn. L. Rev. 919 (2001).

8.

On AEDPA, see, e.g., Edwards v. Vannoy, 141 S. Ct. 1547 (2021) (holding
that a decision requiring jury unanimity in criminal cases was not retroactive); Bucklew v. Precythe, 139 S. Ct. 1112 (2019) (rejecting a death row
inmate’s challenge to the state’s method of execution); Montgomery v.
Louisiana, 577 U.S. 190 (2016) (holding that a ruling barring sentences of
life without parole for juvenile offenders applied retroactively); Felkner v.
Jackson, 562 U.S. 594 (2011) (overturning habeas relief where the federal
district court showed insufficient deference to the findings of the state
courts). On the PLRA, see, e.g., Lomax v. Ortiz-Marquez, 140 S. Ct. 1721
(2020) (holding that dismissal of a prisoner’s lawsuit, with or without
prejudice, counts as a PLRA “strike”); Ross v. Blake, 578 U.S. 632 (2016)
(finding that federal courts must strictly construe the PLRA’s exhaustion
requirement); Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493 (2011) (affirming an order
that limited the population of an overcrowded state prison); Cutter v.
Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709 (2005) (rejecting claims that state prison officials
had failed to accommodate inmates’ exercise of their religious beliefs).

9.

Nancy J. King, Equitable Powers after AEDPA—Lessons from the
Pandemic, 72 Case W. Rsrv. L. Rev. 631 (2022).
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but cautions that those considerations will not inevitably militate in
favor of relief in all circumstances. She urges Congress and the judiciary
to retain the flexibility embodied in Section 2241 while continuing to
debate the appropriate exercise of federal habeas authority.
The next article focuses on the PLRA. Margo Schlanger and Betsy
Ginsberg analyze the effect of that measure’s strict exhaustion
requirement on the ability of inmates to obtain judicial review of the
conditions of confinement during the pandemic.10 The authors make
clear their general skepticism of the exhaustion requirement and explain
why that requirement is especially problematic during a public health
emergency. Accepting that the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement will
remain on the books, however, Professors Schlanger and Ginsberg
suggest several ways to ameliorate its impact on pandemic-related
prisoner claims. First, courts should allow cases to proceed if a health
emergency makes it impractical for a prison grievance system to afford
meaningful preventive measures in a timely fashion. Second, correctional institutions could create emergency grievance systems and the
government could decline to assert exhaustion defenses in emergencies.
Finally, Congress could amend the PLRA to eliminate the exhaustion
requirement during an emergency.
Rounding out this portion of the symposium, Hadar Aviram
analyzes COVID-related litigation involving California prisons.11 She
focuses on two sets of claims, one a federal class action brought under
the PLRA and the other a large number of state habeas corpus
proceedings where the PLRA’s restrictions do not apply. In the federal
case, Professor Aviram notes the shrinking scope of the proposed
remedy from reduction in prison population to inmate vaccination to
staff vaccination as well as the government’s obduracy and the court’s
hesitancy. She also chronicles the state proceedings at every level of the
California judiciary. Neither the federal nor the state litigation resulted
in meaningful relief. Professor Aviram suggests that these failures
reflect both the inadequacies of legal doctrine and the deep-seated public hostility toward prisoners.
The remaining articles address general issues beyond the pandemic.
William M. Carter, Jr., focuses on both AEDPA and the PLRA,
observing that they impose wholesale and unique restrictions on the
ability of incarcerated persons to gain access to the federal courts.12 He
recognizes that restrictions on access to the courts are not unusual but
10.

Margo Schlanger & Betsy Ginsberg, Pandemic Rules: COVID-19 and the
Prison Litigation Reform Act’s Exhaustion Requirement, 72 Case W.
Rsrv. L. Rev. 533 (2022).

11.

Hadar Aviram, The House Always Wins: Doctrine and Animus in
California’s COVID-19 Prison Litigation, 72 Case W. Rsrv. L. Rev.
565 (2022).

12.

William M. Carter, Jr., Outsider Speech: The PLRA, AEDPA, and
Adjudicative Expression, 72 Case W. Rsrv. L. Rev. 643 (2022).
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likens the broad restrictions in these statutes to the restrictions on
judicial access for both enslaved persons and free Blacks before the Civil
War. Professor Carter then takes a contemporary perspective, analyzing AEDPA and the PLRA through a First Amendment lens. He
suggests that the statutory restrictions on access to the federal courts
be viewed as content-based, viewpoint-based, and speaker-based restrictions on expression. Applying current doctrine, he urges that such
restrictions should trigger strict scrutiny and that courts should hold
them to be inconsistent with the First Amendment. But he doubts that
courts would reach that conclusion.
The final two articles focus on different aspects of AEDPA. Paul J.
Larkin endorses the law’s requirement that federal habeas courts defer
to state courts’ reasonable interpretation of Supreme Court jurisprudence.13 Mr. Larkin traces the history of federal habeas review of state
criminal convictions, criticizes the expansion of that review starting in
the 1950s, defends the congressional decision in AEDPA to restrict
federal habeas review of state convictions, and rebuts constitutional
objections under the Suspension Clause,14 the Vesting Clause,15 and the
Due Process Clause16 to the changes in federal habeas review that
AEDPA implemented.
In the last contribution to the symposium, Judge J. Philip
Calabrese suggests an amendment to AEDPA in cases where a habeas
claimant advances a colorable claim of actual innocence.17 As currently
written, the statute might prevent a prisoner who asserts such a colorable innocence claim from obtaining appellate review of the denial of
relief. Judge Calabrese suggests that a prisoner in such circumstances
should not be required to obtain a certificate of appealability in order
to get appellate review.
These articles address a wide range of issues under both AEDPA
and the PLRA.18 In addition to the pieces that appear in this issue,
13.

Paul J. Larkin, The Reasonableness of the “Reasonableness” Standard of
Habeas Corpus Review Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act of 1996, 72 Case W. Rsrv. L. Rev. 669 (2022).

14.

U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 2 (“The privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus
shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the
public Safety may require it.”).

15.

U.S. Const. art. III, § 1 (“The judicial Power of the United States, shall
be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress
may from time to time ordain and establish.”).

16.

U.S. Const. amend. V (“No person shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law . . . .”).

17.

J. Philip Calabrese, Codifying Innocence: A Modest Step Toward Reform,
72 Case W. Rsrv. L. Rev. 745 (2022).

18.

This issue also contains a student contribution that, while not formally
part of the symposium, addresses a PLRA issue. See Mark Firmin, Note,
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several practitioners and federal judges offered their perspectives on
these statutes. The entire program is available online.19
This symposium would not have been possible without the enthusiastic support of many individuals and entities. First, thanks to Deans
Jessica W. Berg and Michael P. Scharf for their continuing assistance
and encouragement.
The Federal Litigation Section of the Federal Bar Association and
the FBA’s Northern District of Ohio chapter provided financial support
and co-sponsored the program. We also obtained a grant from the
Attorney Admissions Fund of the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Ohio. We are especially grateful for all of this external backing.
Two editors of the Law Review deserve special recognition.
Symposium Editor Reagan Joy and Editor-in-Chief Andrew Rumschlag
developed the symposium and carried it out flawlessly.
Finally, Eric Siler provided extraordinary staff support for the
symposium, making sure that everything went smoothly. He has consistently facilitated Law Review programs, so his work this year was par
for the course. We cannot thank him enough.

Murphy’s Law: For Attorney’s Fees Shifting Under the PLRA, Everything
That Could Go Wrong Has Gone Wrong, 72 Case W. Rsrv. L. Rev.
751 (2022).
19.

AEDPA and the PLRA After 25 Years, Nov. 12, 2021, https://case.edu/
law/our-school/events-lectures/aedpa-and-plra-after-25-years-casewestern-reserve-law-review-symposium [https://perma.cc/64JK-EJSP].
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